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Abstract—It is widely acknowledged that the proliferation of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) may lead to serious concerns
regarding avionics safety, particularly when end-users are not
adhering to air safety regulations. There are, however, domains
in which UAVs may help to increase the safety of airplanes
and the management of flights and airport resources that
often require substantial human resources. For instance, Paris
Charles de Gaulle airport (CDG) has more than 7,000 staff and
supports 30,000 direct jobs for more than 60 million passengers
per year (as of 2016). Indeed, these new systems can be used
beneficially for several purposes, even in sensitive areas like
airports. Among the considered applications are those that
suggest using UAVs to enhance safety of on-ground airplanes;
for instance, by collecting (once the aircraft has landed) data
recorded by different systems during the flight (like the sensors
of the Aircraft Data Networks - ADN) or by examining the
state of airplane structure. In this paper, our proposal is to use
UAVs, under the control of the airport authorities, to inventory
and track various tagged assets, such as luggage, supplies
required for the flights, and maintenance tools. The aim of
our proposal is to make airport management systems more
efficient for operations requiring inventory and tracking, along
with increasing safety (sensitive assets such as refueling tanks,
or sensitive pieces of luggage can be tracked), thus raising
financial profit.
1. Introduction
Airlines carry millions of passengers all around the
world. This task not only requires to take care of the
passengers themselves but also of all necessary equipment,
like luggage, tools, refueling vehicles and catering resources.
Tracking all of these is a major challenge that cannot be
achieved efficiently by hand, even though this is how it is
performed today. From a passenger’s perspective, luggage
loss is a common occurrence; from an airline safety staff’s
point of view, a broken or missing safety piece of equipment,
e.g. an oxygen mask, can be a major safety risk.
To improve this process, we propose a novel approach
where all these assets are the subject of an inventory collated
by a UAV. By doing so, we believe that the inventory can be
carried out in a timely manner and performed several times
if required, depending on flight and spatial constraints of
a particular airport. Naturally, using UAVs in the vicinity
of airports is not straightforward. Authorization by national
flight control authorities and airport regulation bodies will
be required, but by being situated in an area already subject
to strong aerial regulations can make it easier to deal with.
Furthermore the different regulation authorities are usually
willing today to experiment new real world use cases of
UAVs. However, this issue is out of the scope of the current
paper.
1.1. Context
There exists several initiatives that support the process
of luggage management in airports: a) to enable the travelers
to track their luggage, e.g. at suitcase manufacturer level [1,
2] or at airline company level [3, 4], from checking/drop-off
desk (and even before, to prevent theft) up to the loading in
hold of the aircraft; b) to enable airline companies to im-
prove tracking of checked luggages [5, 6]. Moreover, some
major airports, such as Hong Kong, Dubai, Las Vegas, have
already adopted RFID-enabled baggage handling systems to
improve sorting and tracking efficiency.
Our scenario is therefore realistic because it corresponds
to a real need and should contribute to improve the process,
not only for luggage but also for all the assets airline compa-
nies need to deal with (for safety, repair, catering, etc.). The
combination of UAVs and RFIDs for such operations can be
more efficient than the standard procedures: UAVs can cover
a large area, while embedded RFIDs on aircraft equipment,
like oxygen generators, life vests and cabin emergency
equipment, can drastically reduce inventory times. Delta
Airlines, for instance, has installed more than 240,000 RFID
tags on emergency pieces of equipment on all of its own and
leased aircrafts. As a result, the company can check their
expiration dates aboard an aircraft in a few minutes, rather
than approximately eight hours without RFID tags [7].
It is already the case that in some airports, not only
luggage is equipped with RFID tags, but also maintenance
tools [8, 9]. It is thus most likely to become a general
approach (perhaps even subject to some regulation) because
of the safety enforcement it makes it possible to support.
1.2. Problem statement
The context of operation of the UAVs and the goals to
achieve raise a number of constraints and issues that must
be taken into account.
1.2.1. Performance. From a functional perspective, using
UAVs for inventorying implies to two main requirements.
First, the inventory should be achieved in a timely manner,
which means that detecting an RFID and collecting data
from it should be as fast as possible. Second, the collection
process and identification protocol should also be efficient to
avoid several identification attempts that would waste time.
Additionally, one should keep in mind that the UAVs – at
least the kind of small UAV that could be used for this
sort of operation – has limited resources, and the required
computation should be minimised.
1.2.2. Security and privacy. Security and privacy are
strong requirements. In security terms, only the supervising
authority should have access to the results of the inventory
and tracking processes. Privacy is also important; it should
not be possible, for example, for unauthorized persons to
trace pieces of luggage or safety/security-related assets.
Hence, we propose the use of lightweight secure and
privacy-preserving serverless protocols as defined in arti-
cle [10] for UAVs and RFIDs (on tagged assets) to per-
form efficient inventory and search operations. Security is
achieved by means of the serverless protocols that enable
centrally controlled devices to autonomously authenticate
each other without the active participation of a centralized
authentication or authorization server [11]. As such, they are
appropriate in the airports such that UAVs and RFIDs, even
if disconnected from the airport network infrastructure, may
establish a mutually authenticated and secure channel among
the involved communicating entities (i.e. among UAVs, and
between UAV and RFID tags).
1.2.3. Energy consumption. In airport contexts, the UAVs
ought to be of small size (for safety, security and space
reasons), and so energy efficiency is paramount. The rational
behind this requirement is based on the limitation of battery
size (batteries have a substantial weight and a proper ratio
between autonomy and weight has to be found). Airports
being large areas and the number of assets to inventory
and track being possibly large, energy consumption must
be optimized to ensure a reasonable flight time without
reloading the batteries.
1.3. Contributions
In this paper, our main goals are to propose two server-
less protocols to enhance efficiency in inventory and tracking
operations of RFID tagged assets in airport with support of
UAVs. The proposed protocols, adapted from the Mtita et.
al.’s [10] protocols for traditional RFID applications, are
ideal for the UAVs in the airport environment to ensure
reliable and energy-efficient inventory and search operations
over some tagged assets without compromising their security
and privacy.
The salient contributions of this paper are to propose
suitable serverless protocols in the context of airport inven-
tory control and tracking systems with:
a) an authentication protocol for mass identification of a
group of RFID tags within a vicinity;
b) a search protocol to identify a selected group of RFID
tags within the proximity.
1.4. Structure of the Paper
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the related work on UAV-based so-
lutions and serverless protocols. In Section 3, we introduce
the inventory and tracking system model by describing the
involved entities, the requirements to ensure performance
(computational and power-consumption efficiency), security
and privacy, the assumptions, the threat and attack models.
Section 4 details the two serverless protocols. In Sections 5
and 6, the performance, security and privacy analysis of the
two protocols are conducted. Finally, Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2. Related Work
As mentioned previously, there is potential the use of
UAVs to facilitate the inventory of assets in airports (e.g.
luggages, supplies required for the flights, maintenance
tools) by communicating with the respective tags through
authentication and search functionalities. The most feasible
way is to make use of RFID technologies: i.e. attach RFID
tags on assets and equip UAV with RFID readers. The
first part of this section presents the inventory UAV-based
solution, while the rest is devoted to analyzing RFID-related
security protocols.
2.1. Inventory UAV-based Solutions
Since their invention, UAVs have been used for surveil-
lance mission: e.g. for fire detection in forest for civilian
application, for enemy detection in military application.
Thanks to their capability to cover wide area in a minimal
time, inventory and tracking solutions have been promptly
proposed and even some proposals are currently patented.
In [12], Shondel proposed an aerial inventory system for
maintaining an inventory record of shipping vessels at a
storage facility. In [13], McAllister claimed invention of a
mobile aerial RFID scanning platform. In [14], car dealer-
ships claimed to save days of inventory using UAV reading
passive ultrahigh-frequency (UHF) RFID tags or BLE bea-
cons attached to cars. In 2007, Ong et al. [15, 16] proposed
an RFID-equipped UAV to aid inventory automation in a
warehouse. Similar ideas were developed by Bae et al. in
[17] and by Andrukiewicz et al. in [18]. In [19], Longhi et
al. studied electromagnetic aspects (propagation model, etc.)
of the communication between an UAV and passive tags.
Recently, Greco et al. [20] proposed to use UAV to
localize RFID sensors in [21] and to collect data from the
RFID sensors scattered throughout the area by simply flying
above them. However, in these two papers, the RFID sensors
are not true RFID tags, i.e. they are not passive tags, but
active wireless RFID nodes operating at 433 MHz. Still
related to UAV and RFID, but out of the scope of the paper,
in [22], Choi et al. proposed an indoor localization method
for UAV using passive UHF RFID tags. It is worth noting
that none of the aforementioned work deals with security
aspects.
Since there is no work focusing on security and privacy
issues between UAV and RFID, the two following papers
related to security protocols for UAV and wireless sensors
need to be mentioned. In [23], Won et al. proposed a secure
communication protocol enabling a UAV to collect data
from smart objects (i.e. wireless nodes). The closest work is
the secure and trusted channel protocol proposed by Akram
et al. [24] to enable in the airport environment a UAV to
establish secure communication with sensors of a wireless
Aircraft Data Network and other systems to collect data.
The main difference with these two proposals, apart from
the absence of RFID, is that the cryptographic operations
used are more complex than those we use in this paper.
2.2. Serverless Protocols
RFID security protocols can be categorized into two
groups: connection-oriented and connectionless (or server-
less) protocols. Connection-oriented protocols dictate that
an RFID reader – a UAV in our case – establishes and
maintains a communication channel with the backend or
database server during the course of authentication with the
tags. Alternatively, connectionless or serverless protocols
do not require an established communication between the
server and the RFID reader during authentication. The latter
case is more pertinent to the UAV case at hand, as it allows
for greater mobility and resilience. This section focuses
on the serverless authentication protocols, particularly the
authentication and secure tag search protocols.
2.2.1. RFID Authentication Protocols. To the best of our
knowledge, the use of serverless protocols for RFID au-
thentication was first instigated by Tan et al. [25] in their
article Serverless search and authentication RFID protocols
published in 2008. They proposed protocols aimed at solving
two fundamental problems: first, the identification of tags by
readers with no persistent connection to a central database;
and second, securely search tags without leaking identifying
information to adversaries. In 2013, the authors of [26]
found that Tan et al.’s protocols are vulnerable to traceability,
impersonation and privacy attacks.
In 2009, Lin et al. [27] proposed a serverless RFID
authentication protocol to improve the computational perfor-
mance of Tan et al.’s [25] authentication protocol. However,
Lee et al. [28] note that Lin et al.’s protocol only performs a
one sided authentication, that is, the reader authenticates the
tag, but the tag does not authenticate the reader. Moreover,
Lin et al.’s proposed protocol is still vulnerable to imper-
sonation attack [28].
Hoque et al. proposed a serverless, untraceable authen-
tication, and forward secure protocol for RFID tags [29]
claiming that their protocol secures both reader and tag
against common attacks with no need for a central database’s
mediation. But, this claim was disproved by Deng et al. [30]
by showing that Hoque et al.’s protocol was susceptible to
data desynchronization attack. Deng et al. also improved
Hoque et al.’s [29] authentication protocol in order to with-
stand data desynchronization attacks. However, the authors
of [31] found that Deng et al.’s protocol is still vulnerable
to data desynchronization attack after two protocol runs.
In 2015, Abdolmaleky et al. [32] proposed a protocol to
address the weaknesses found in the protocols proposed by
Hoque et al. [29] and Deng et al. [30], which are tag imper-
sonation and reader impersonation attacks. Their proposed
protocol [32] solved these problems but after analysis we
found that it has very limited use for mass authentication.
Indeed, in their proposal, once the reader is granted access
to the tag(s), the backend server can no longer access the
respective tag(s). This restriction may make sense in some
domains of applications, but its usability is very limited in
the mass authentication scenarios where disparate readers
simultaneously authenticate tags within their vicinity.
ERAP, ECC-based RFID Authentication Protocol [33],
is a serverless protocol ensuring mutual authentication be-
tween reader and authorized RFID tags. This scheme was
found vulnerable to denial of service attack by authors
of [34]. The authors of [35] also proposed (HOA) HLRO
Authentication, an ECC-based authentication scheme suit-
able for low-power mobile devices. However this protocol
has a strong requirement that each communicating entity
has prior knowledge about each other and it is too much
CPU and memory demanding as tags must perform ECC
and modular operations.
Timestamp is an interesting element for authentication
support by constrained devices, as first suggested in 2006
by Tsudik [36]. Considering that constrained devices do not
have embedded clocks, it was quite a novel idea at the time
it was instigated. Tsudik’s view was simple, a tag stores a
static timestamp and an RFID reader periodically broadcasts
timestamp of its current time. A tag, in the vicinity of
a reader, receives and compares the broadcast timestamp
against the stored timestamp. If the broadcast timestamp
is larger than the stored timestamp, the tag updates its
timestamp and replies with a keyed hash over its permanent
key and the new timestamp. Otherwise, the tag sends a
random value generated by a Pseudo Random Number Gen-
erator (PRNG) to confuse an adversary and avoid narrowing
attacks. Narrowing attack occurs when the adversary queries
a tag with a particular timestamp and then later tries to
identify the same tag by querying a candidate tag with a
timestamp slightly above the previous one [36].
Tsudik [36] himself noted that his proposed scheme
is susceptible to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks as an
adversary can easily desynchronize a tag by sending a
timestamp value that is ahead of time. This idea was later
improved by authors of [37] by moving the attack from
the resource constrained tag to the powerful backend server.
The improvement aimed at thwarting DoS attacks against
the tags but it also resulted to an exhaustive search to the
backend server.
The mutual authentication and search protocols adapted
in this article were proposed in [10], where the authors
claim that their protocols hold in resisting all common
security attacks and provide the best performance by using
lightweight security primitives.
2.2.2. Secure RFID Tag Search Protocols. Like serverless
authentication protocols, the idea of secure RFID tag search
protocols was introduced by Tan et al. [25] for the purpose
of simplifying RFID readers to easily locate a target tag.
Nevertheless, tag search protocols have not received the
attention [38] that mutual authentication protocols received.
Nonetheless, they provide a very useful functionality in
efficiently locating a specific tag within a group of tags.
Tan et al. [25] proposed tag search protocol. Their pro-
tocol is found to perform unidirectional authentication [39],
i.e the reader authenticates a tag but the tag does not
authenticate the reader. In turn, the tag cannot be certain
of the authenticity of the reader as any other entity can
masquerade as a reader and fool the tag. The protocol is
also susceptible to reader’s identity disclosure, replay, and
impersonation attacks as analyzed by Lee et al. [28].
In 2009, Lin et al. [27] proposed a search protocol by
improving Tan et al.’s protocol, but Lin et al.’s protocol was
found to be susceptible to replay and impersonation attacks.
In 2011, Chun et al. [39] proposed an RFID tag search pro-
tocol with the goal of preserving privacy of communicating
parties. However, as the authors of [40] noted, Chun et al.’s
protocol is susceptible to tracking attacks due to static values
sent from the reader to the tag.
In 2012, Lee et al. [28] also proposed an RFID search
protocol. Their protocol uses hash function twice on the
same parameter and also makes use of PRNG on the tag
side. These operations consume a lot of resources with
respect to the computational constraints of most RFID
tags [40].
In 2014, Xie et al. [41] proposed a secure tag search
protocol in their article, RFID seeking: Finding a lost tag
rather than only detecting its missing, which is secure
against common attacks such as replay, traceability and DoS.
Xie et al.’s [41] protocol was later improved by Jeon et
al. [42] in 2014. Jeon et al.’s protocol suffers from the reader
traceability attack, which was not in the original protocol
proposed by Xie et al. [41]. It is observed that the lack of
context in the protocol between the reader and the tag leads
to the replay attacks.
In 2017, Sundaresan et al. [43] proposed a secure search
protocol for low cost passive RFID tags, which is based on
quadratic residues. The authors claim that the tag running
their protocol performs only simple security primitives such
as XOR (⊕), modular arithmetic operation (mod) and 128-
bit PRNG, thus achieving compliance with EPC standards.
However, the author specifically state that their protocol
requires the reader must maintain a connection to the back-
end server during authentication phase as the server must
perform some of the critical operations; this disqualifies it
as a candidate for search protocols for the scenarios in this
article.
The search protocols described above make use of static
authentication parameters, which do not expire. This implies
that the reader is only authorized once and the parameters
remain valid forever. Moreover, once the reader is compro-
mised, the parameters cannot be revoked, hence tags can
be accessed by adversaries without any remedies to the
problem.
In 2016, Mtita et al. [10] proposed a secure serverless
search protocol which is adapted in this article to provide
a secure search functionality for the UAVs. The authors
claim that their protocol is lightweight, as tags perform very
few operations during the search query and only one tag
responds, if the right tag is present. Likewise, they claim
that the search protocol is resistant to narrowing attacks,
replay and cloning attacks [36].
3. Inventory and Tracking System Model
This section outlines specifications for each player in-
volved in the system and protocols, in addition to the per-
formance, security and privacy requirements, assumptions,
and threat and attack models.
3.1. Entities
The protocols proposed in this article involve the inter-
action between three parties as presented below with their
respective characteristics. The definition of each parameter
used in the protocols is provided in Table 1.
• Backend Server: denoted as S is a trusted, powerful
entity with unlimited resources. S has a list of all
legitimate tags and UAVs, hence it plays a role of
assigning parameters to UAVs for accessing authorized
tags. Note that the server is offline when the UAV is
launching an authentication session with the tags.
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV): denoted as UAVj ,
has finite resources for storage, computation, energy
and communication. UAVj stores a list of tags Lj ,
which represents all authorized tags that UAVj can
authenticate and exchange information with. UAVj
remains untrusted by the tags until the mutual authen-
tication phase is successfully completed.
• RFID Tag: denoted as ρi, the tag is characterized
by scarce resources in terms of storage, computation,
energy and communication. Each tag ρi has a unique
identifier idi that doubles as a secret key shared with
the backend server S. Likewise, each tag ρi has a
static timestamp TSY S initialized at the time of tag’s
manufacture and does not need to be tag-unique.
3.2. Performance Requirements
To ensure computational and energy consumption effi-
ciency of our protocols, the main players of the protocols,
i.e. UAVs and tags, must only use lightweight operations.
3.3. Security and Privacy Requirements
The following security and privacy requirements must be
present in our proposed mutual authentication and secure tag
search protocols.
Mutual Authentication. Our protocols must perform mu-
tual authentication in order to establish mutual trust between
tags and UAVs, eventually avoiding impersonation.
Freshness. Protocols must enforce message freshness in or-
der to thwart replay attacks. Our proposed protocols enforce
freshness by generating each message using random values
during each protocol run.
Untraceability. Non-traceability, or untraceability, entails
that it should not be possible for a tag (or UAV) to be
identified based solely on the exchanged messages nor to
link two different sessions to the same tag (or UAV).
3.4. Assumptions
• Backend server is a trusted entity and cannot be com-
promised.
• Backend server allocates only a fraction of RFID tags
to each UAV for authentication.
• PRNG and keyed Hash-based Message Authentication
Code (HMAC) functions are considered as robust.
3.5. Threat and Attack Models
To model the security and privacy for our protocols,
we consider a polynomial time adversary α attacking our
proposed protocols following the games described below
with the aim of gaining access to secret information or
disrupting a normal protocol run. The security and privacy
games are designed to show the capabilities, limitations
and options of the adversary as he attempts to break the
protocols. The games described hereafter can apply to the
proposed protocols depicted in Figures 2 and 3.
Game 1: α masquerades as UAV
• step 1.1: α observes and eavesdrops several exchanges
between legitimate UAVj and one or more tags.
• step 1.2: α sends messages A and C (respectively, only
message A for the tag search protocol) to tag ρi.
α wins if he can send valid message C.
Game 2: α creates a new counterfeit tag ρx
• step 2.1: α physically attacks ρi’s to access its data.
• step 2.2: α uses the data from valid ρi to create other
counterfeit tags ρx where x 6= i.
α wins if he can create counterfeit tag ρx and fool
legitimate UAVj .
Game 3: α tracks tag ρi
• step 3.1: α is able to observe exchanges between
legitimate UAVj and tags ρ1 and ρ2, one after the other,
for a polynomial number of times each.
• step 3.2: The challenger selects a tag ρi, i ∈ {1, 2}, and
let it authenticate to UAVj . α listens to the exchanges
and sends a guessed value i to the challenger.
α wins the game if value i is correct. The protocol is
considered private if α cannot win the game with a
probability greater than 0.5.
4. Search and Authentication Protocols
This section presents security protocols relevant to secur-
ing the communication between UAVs and the correspond-
ing authorized tags.
Due to the high mobility of UAVs, serverless mutual
authentication and search protocols seem ideal to solve
the security and privacy problems. A mutual authentication
protocol helps to simultaneously authenticate an UAV with
a large number of tags attached to assets (e.g. luggages,
supplies required for the flights, maintenance tools). The
mass authentication is useful where a large number of assets
need to be securely and quickly authenticated at once.
On the other hand, the secure search protocol is useful
in efficiently locating a specific tag attached to a baggage
among a number of other tags. The efficiency of the search
protocol is due to its ability to narrow down the query that
forces only the target tag to respond to the authentic request.
The two serverless protocols proposed in this section
complement one another and share the same first phase. The
first phase presented in section 4.2 involves authorization
between an UAV and the central backend server. Each UAV
must perform this phase prior to commencing the second
phase of the protocols, which involves either authentication
or search. We describe the common phase before we start
explaining how each of the individual authentication and
search phase work.
4.1. Protocol Notations
The protocols description and figures in the following
sections will be described using notations given in Table 1.
In Table 1, ARij represents encoded access rights for
UAVj with respect to the data stored in tags tempij . In
this article, ARij is represented in the form of a code,
like Unix file permissions, with Read, Write and Execute
options. Time windowWSj is a 64-bit parameter represented
as [T0j ||TZj ], where T0j is the start date and TZj is the end
date defining the time limits for the specific UAVj to access
the tags within the list Lj .
Table 1. PROTOCOL NOTATIONS WITH SIZE ESTIMATIONS
Parameter name Symbol Bits
Tag’s Static Timestamp TSY S 32
UAV’s Timestamp tj 32
Start date T0j 32
End date TZj 32
Time window WSj 64
Access rights ARij 128
Tag’s Random Number ri 128
UAV’s Random Number rj 128
Tag’s Identifier idi 128
Temporary Tag’s Identifier tempij 128
Tag’s Key Kij 160
HMACs (from UAV or Tag) Hij , Vij 160
Identify of UAVj IDUAVj -
List of authorized tags Lj -
Concatenation operator || -
4.2. Authorization between Backend Server and
UAV
The authorization phase, depicted in Figure 1, involves
the exchange between an UAV, UAVj , and the backend
server, S, through a secure channel, where UAVj acquires
appropriate access rights from the server to access a group
of tags attached to assets.
1) S generates a key Kij and a temporary identity tempij
corresponding to each tag ρi that UAVj is authorized
to access to with the given access rights ARij . The key
Kij and identity tempij of each tag are ephemeral and
derived from the time window WSj and start date T0j
generated by S, respectively.
Kij = HMACidi(WSj ||ARij) (1)
tempij = HMACidi(T0j ) (2)
2) S builds a list of authenticated tags Lj granted to UAVj
for a given time windowWSj with access rights ARij .
S is assumed to assign different time windows WSj
and ARij to different UAVs.
Lj = {(temp1j,K1j), ..., (tempij ,Kij)} (3)
3) S securely sends Lj , ARij , and WSj to UAVj .
4.3. Serverless Authentication between UAV and
Tags
After running a mandatory preliminary phase of autho-
rization with the backend server, depicted in section 4.2 and
Figure 1, UAVj is ready to perform mutual authentication
phase with the tags in the list Lj . The mutual authentication
phase, described in Figure 2, involves verification and au-
thentication between UAVj and a tag ρi with the purpose
of guaranteeing the authenticity of UAVs and tags during
communication and exchange of secret data.
As UAVj flies over assets, it broadcasts a message A
containing WSj , ARij , and rj . All tags within the vicinity
of UAVj respond with a challenge containing ri and Hij =
HMACK′ij (ri||rj), where ri is the random number gener-
ated by a respective tag. Upon receipt of message B from
multiple tags, UAVj calculates H
′
ij = HMACKij (ri||rj)
using the values of Kij in the list Lj . If the corresponding
value of Hij is found, UAVj authenticates the respective
tag and replies with Vij and tj via message C.
Upon receipt of message C, ρi checks the validity of
Vij . The correct value of Vij authenticates UAVj and leads
ρi to update its timestamp TSY S with a received timestamp
tj .
Session Key Generation. The shared session key KS =
HMACK′ij (tj ||ri||WSj ) is locally generated in both UAVj
and ρi using parameters exchanged during the mutual au-
thentication phase in steps d26 and d34, respectively. It
should be noted that, a session key KS only serves to en-
crypt data exchanged, if need arise. However, the generated
shared key KS plays no role during the next authentication
sessions and is only valid during the respective time frame,
hence a session key. The proposed protocol does not require
synchronizing or updating parameters between authentica-
tion sessions.
4.4. Serverless Secure Tag Search Protocol
RFID tag search protocol allows an UAV to securely
search for a particular tag among a group of tags within
its vicinity, authenticate the tag and initiate a secure data
exchange session. RFID tag search functionality is a basic
and invaluable tool for efficiently searching among a large
amounts of tags [25] without the need to authenticate all
tags in the vicinity prior to finding the right one. The tag
search protocol minimizes the time to search for a known
tag within a group of tags.
Authentication. When UAVj wants to search for a specific
tag with a temporary identity tempij from the list of tags
Lj , it calculates Hij = HMACKij (tj) where tj is the
UAVj’s current timestamp and Kij is the key corresponding
to a tag with identity tempij . UAVj broadcasts message A
containingWSj , ARij , Hij and tj to all tags in the vicinity.
After receiving message A, a tag ρi validates the param-
eters received, calculates its temporary key Kij and checks
whether it is the intended recipient tag by calculating and
comparing H ′ij == Hij . If it is indeed the intended tag
and the values are correct, the tag authenticates the UAVj
and ρi updates its timestamp TSY S before replying with a
challenge Vij and ri to UAVj . The other tags do not respond
to the query.
Upon receipt of message B, UAVj verifies Vij . If Vij
is valid, UAVj authenticates ρi.
Session Key Generation. UAVj and tag ρi compute a
shared key KS using parameters from both parties in steps
e23 and e18, respectively. KS is used to securely exchange
data between UAVj and ρi using an encryption scheme
which is out of the scope of this paper.
Backend Server S Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UAVj
Knows all legitimate tags and UAVs
Secure Session Initialization
⇀↽ The UAV has an identity IDUAVj
Request, IDUAVj
←−
c11: Get the list of tags that UAVj has access to: id1, id2, ..., idi
c12: Assign access rights relative to the UAVj : ARij
c13: Get the start and end dates when the UAVj is granted access to tags: T0j and TZj
c14: Synchronize time with UAVj
c15: Generate time window relative to UAVj ’s allowed access to given tags: WSj = {T0j ||TZj }
c16: For each tag ρi generate:
c17: Temporary identity: tempij = HMACidi (T0j )
c18: Temporary key: Kij = HMACidi (WSj ||ARij)
c19: Then generate a list of tags credentials:
Lj = {(temp1j ,K1j), ..., (tempij ,Kij)}
Send Lj,WSj
and ARij
−→
Receive and store:
c21: Authorized tags list: Lj = {(temp1j ,K1j), ..., (tempij ,Kij)}
c22: Time window: WSj
c23: Access rights: ARij
Figure 1. Authorization between a backend RFID server and a UAV supporting authentication and access rights assignment
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UAVj Tag ρi
UAV knows from Authorization phase: Tag has TSY S , idi
1) Authorized tags list: Lj = {(temp1j ,K1j), ..., (tempij ,Kij)}
2) Time window: WSj
3) Access rights: ARij
d01: Generate rj
A : WSj
, ARij, rj
−→ d11 : if (TZj > TSY S)&(TSY S > T0j ) {
d12 : K
′
ij = HMACidi (WSj ||ARij)
d13 : Generate ri
B: Hij, ri
←− d14 : Hij = HMACK′
ij
(ri||rj)
}
d21 : Search (∀ Kij ∈ Lj) {
d22 : Calculate H
′
ij = HMACKij (ri||rj)
d23 : if (H
′
ij == Hij){ // A Tag with valid Kij found in the list
d24 : Get system time tj
d25 : Calculate Vij = HMACKij (ri||tj)
C: Vij , tj
−→ d31 : V
′
ij = HMACK′
ij
(ri||tj)
d26 : KS = HMACKij (tj ||ri||WSj ) d32 : if (V
′
ij == Vij) { // Valid Vij authenticates UAV
} d33 : Update TSY S = tj
d27 : if( Kij /∈ Lj) { // Tag not in the list d34 : KS = HMACK′
ij
(Tj ||ri||WSj )
d28 : UNAUTHORIZED TAG, IGNORE }
}
Figure 2. Our Serverless Authentication Protocol between UAV and Tag
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UAVj Tag ρi
UAV knows from Authorization phase: Tag has TSY S , idi
1. Authorized tags list: Lj = {(temp1j ,K1j), ..., (tempij , Kij)}
2. Time window: WSj
3. Access rights: ARij
// To search for a particular tag
e01 : Choose a specific tag’s identity tempij to search for
e02 : Get UAV’s current timestamp tj
e03 : Calculate Hij = HMACKij (tj)
A: WSj
, ARij, Hij , tj
−→
e11 : if((TZj > TSY S)&(TZj > tj)&(tj > TSY S)&(TSY S > T0j )) {
e12 : K
′
ij = HMACidi (WSj ||ARij)
e13 : H
′
ij = HMACK′
ij
(tj)
e14 : if (H
′
ij == Hij) { // Correct tag and authentic UAVj
e15 : Generate ri
e16 : Update TSY S = tj
e21 : Calculate V
′
ij = HMACKij (tj ||ri)
B: Vij, ri
←− e17 : Vij = HMACK′
ij
(tj ||ri)
e22 : if (V
′
ij == Vij) // Tag tempij exists and is authentic e18 : KS = HMACK′
ij
(tj ||ri||WSj )
e23 : KS = HMACKij (tj ||ri||WSj ) }
else }
e24 : IGNORE // Tag ρi with identity tempij does not exist
Figure 3. Our Serverless Secure RFID Tag Search Protocol
5. Performance Analysis
This section analyses the performance of our proposed
authentication and search protocols relative to other proto-
cols.
It is worth noting that the Computational Cost of both UAVs
and tags for both protocols is lightweight and compatible
with resource constrained devices since they only need to
have capability to execute basic primitives such as concate-
nation, comparison, and HMAC.
5.1. Performance Analysis for the Authentication
Protocol
Table 2 compares our mutual authentication protocol to
other similar protocols. Hoque et al. [29] protocol performs
authentication using four messages, this translates to energy
overhead due to sending and receiving operations. Our
protocol is attractive as it supports mutual authentication
in three messages. Finally, while Lee et al. [28], Hoque et
al. [29] and Abdolmaleky et al. [32] use hash function in
their implementation, our protocol integrates a HMAC func-
tion for providing a higher security. However, the HMAC
function in our protocol can be easily replaced by any secure
hash or PRNG function that suit the tag’s requirement and
the proposed security and performance properties of our
protocol will still hold.
Table 2. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR SERVERLESS
AUTHENTICATION AND SIMILAR PROTOCOLS
Criteria
Lee et
al. [28]
Hoque
et
al. [29]
Abdolmaleky
et
al. [32]
Our
Protocol
Computation cost 4 hash
2 hash /
1 PRNG
4 hash
3 hmac / 1
PRNG
Total messages 3 4 3 3
Storage cost (bits) 896 1024 1024 864
Communication Cost: In our protocol, the tag ρi sends 288
bits (36 bytes) and receives 512 bits (64 bytes) of data
during communication.
Storage Cost: At the tag, our protocol uses 160 bits
for storing timestamp TSY S and tag’s identifier idi together
with an additional 480 bits during operation for storing
rj ,Kij and Vij which makes a total of 640 bits or 80 bytes.
At the peak moment, just before sending message B, the
tag must store a total of 864 bits or 108 bytes. The UAVj
storage demands vary depending on the number of tags it
is allowed to authenticate at a time, that is the number of
tag parameters contained in list Lj .
5.2. Performance Analysis for the Secure Tag
Search Protocol
The similarities between RFID secure tag search proto-
col and mutual authentication protocol lead to similarities
in performance and security properties. As such, this sec-
tion discusses only a few properties that differ from those
discussed in section 5.1.
The performance comparison between our secure tag
search protocol with other similar protocols is given in
Table 3.
Table 3. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR TAG SEARCH
PROTOCOL AND SIMILAR PROTOCOLS
Criteria
Jeon et
al. [42]
Hoque
et
al. [29]
Xie et
al. [41]
Our
Protocol
Computation cost 4 PRNG
2 hash /
3 PRNG
4 hash
3 hmac / 1
PRNG
Total messages 3 4 3 2
Storage cost (bits) 896 1024 1026 896
Communication Cost: Tag search protocol exchanges only
two messages, one from each party where ρi sends 288
bits (36 bytes) and receives 384 bits (48 bytes) of data.
Storage Cost: The peak storage for the tag search
protocol is the moment just before the tag sends message
B. The total storage space required on the tag is 896 bits
or 112 bytes. This corresponds to the total size of Kij , Vij ,
WSj , ARij , tj , ri, idi, TSY S , and KS .
6. Security and Privacy Analysis
This section analyses the security of our proposed mu-
tual authentication and secure tag search protocols using
relevant threat and attack models put forth in section 3.5.
6.1. Security Analysis for the Authentication Pro-
tocol
As depicted in Table 4, our protocol is the only one
that guarantees the privacy of the tags and its secrets when
the reader is compromised. The rest of the protocols fail to
revoke or change the information granted to the reader after
the initial authorization phase. Moreover, in Lee et al.’s [28]
proposed protocol, the tag always responds with a constant
value, which makes it traceable in all communications with
the same reader. Likewise, Hoque et al.’s [29] protocol
does not provide mutual authentication between the tag and
UAV, hence diminishing the level of trust and security of
the protocol.
Game 1 - α masquerades as UAV. : Referring to Game 1
in section 3.5, α’s objective is to send legitimate messages
A and C. That is, α can either crack the key Kij or directly
generate a valid message C based on sniffed messages A,
B and C of earlier legitimate sessions.
One way to crack Kij is to extract from message B the
values of Kij using public values ri, rj and Hij . This
assumes reversibility of HMAC function, which is contrary
Table 4. SECURITY COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR SERVERLESS
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL AND SIMILAR PROTOCOLS
Security requirement
Lee et
al. [28]
Hoque
et
al. [29]
Abdolmaleky
et
al. [32]
Our
Protocol
Tag untraceability No No Yes Yes
Avoid tag imperson-
ation
No Yes Yes Yes
Avoid replay attack No Yes No Yes
Mutual authentication Yes No Yes Yes
Reader compromise
resistance
No No No Yes
to the assumption made in section 3.4.
Alternatively, α may combine messages A, B and C in
order to deduce valuable information and use it to crack the
key Kij . However, messages B and C behave as random or
pseudo-random strings because they evolve independently
from each other as their inputs are different. As such,
regardless of the number of sniffed messages A, B and C,
it is infeasible to extract any valuable information, and the
game cannot succeed.
Game 2 - α creates counterfeit tags. : In our protocol,
we do not consider any hardware-based defences against
physical attacks. Hence, α may physically compromise
a tag ρi and access everything in it, including secret
information and the information exchanged with UAVj .
To create a fake tag ρx and fool UAVj , α must know
ρx’s identity idx. As the identity of each tag is secret,
different and unique, α cannot guess the identity of tag ρx
by knowing the identity of ρi. Thus, compromising a tag
ρi does not give α the power to derive other tags in Lj ,
hence α cannot win the game.
Game 3 - α tracks ρi. : Referring Game 3 in section 3.5, ρi
and UAVj use random values to generate messages B and C,
respectively. During session k, ρi responds with messages
B1ik and B2ik, which appear random to α. Any response
from ρ1 is semantically indistinguishable from responses of
ρ2, and even to the previously sent responses of ρ1. As such,
an adversary α is unable to guess with a probability greater
than 0.5 which tag ρi sent message B.
6.2. Security Analysis for the Secure Tag Search
Protocol
Table 5 gives a brief comparison between our protocol
and other similar protocols. Our protocol protects tags’
identities from adversaries. Moreover, Jeon et al. [42] suffers
from the replay attack while Hoque et al. [29] proposed
protocol does not perform mutual authentication, hence
reducing trust between the communicating parties.
Our tag search protocol, like our proposed authentication
protocol, is not vulnerable after reader compromise attacks
i.e, the values obtained after compromising the reader cannot
be used indefinitely. However, the rest of the protocols i.e.,
those proposed by Jeon et al. [42], Hoque et al. [29] and
Xie et al. [41] give away crucial information that cannot
be revoked once the reader, UAV in our case, is compro-
mised. The adversary may continually use these values to
communicate with the respective tags without the possibility
of revoking them.
Table 5. SECURITY COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR TAG SEARCH
PROTOCOL AND SIMILAR PROTOCOLS
Security requirement
Jeon et
al. [42]
Hoque
et
al. [29]
Xie et
al. [41]
Our
Protocol
Tag untraceability Yes Yes Yes Yes
Avoid tag imperson-
ation
Yes No Yes Yes
Avoid replay attack No Yes Yes Yes
Mutual authentication Yes No Yes Yes
Reader compromise
resistance
No No No Yes
Game 1 - α masquerades as an UAV. : Referring toGame 1
in section 3.5, α’s objective is to send a valid message A to
ρi. The first idea would be that α replays a valid message A.
However, the message is intended for one specific tag with
the keyKij , and processing of message A by the tag leads to
the tag updating its timestamp. As a consequence, assuming
that the target tag is in the vicinity of the legitimate UAV
when transmitting a valid message A, replays remain useless
as it will be considered by the target tag as out-of-date.
There are two other alternatives for α: cracking the key
Kij or generating a valid message A based on sniffed mes-
sages of earlier valid sessions. For cracking Kij , one way is
to extract the value ofKij from message A or B by reversing
the HMAC function with known public values tj or ri.
However, this contradicts our assumptions of section 3.4.
Alternatively, α can analyse several valid pairs of
messages A and B to generate a new valid message A.
However, messages A and B behave as random or pseudo-
random strings due to their random inputs. Thus, it is not
possible to guess a new valid message A, and the game
cannot succeed.
Game 2 - α creates counterfeit tags. : This game is similar
to the one analysed in the previous authentication protocol
in section 6.1.
Game 3 - α tracks ρi. : As our search tag protocol facilitates
a legitimate UAVj to search and communicate to a chosen
tag within a group, it is also an ideal opportunity for α to
track a tag and launch attacks.
However, launching a successful attack means α must
link message B to a particular tag. As messages B coming
from ρ1 and ρ2 are semantically indistinguishable due to the
random inputs ri and rj , an adversary α cannot guess with
a probability greater than 0.5 which tag ρi sent message B,
and he can not win the game.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have addressed the problem of inventory
and tracking of the RFID tagged assets from different ac-
tors (airline companies, passengers, maintenance staff, etc.)
in airport scenarios, including planes and the assets they
embed. We have put forward an approach that uses a UAV.
To achieve this approach, we have proposed two serverless
protocols:
a) an authentication protocol for mass identification of a
group of RFID tags within a proximity;
b) a search protocol to interact with a specific RFID tags
within the proximity.
We have presented: the inventory and tracking system
model; the requirements to ensure performance in terms of
computation (we are working with constrained systems);
the power-consumption issue; security and privacy goals
- assumptions, threat and attack models. We then have
described the two serverless protocols that we propose to
use and we eventually presented the associated performance,
security and privacy analysis. For performance, security
and privacy, we have shown that the proposed protocols
compare favorably with the relevant literature. Regarding
energy consumption, as proposed protocols are designed
with lightweight operations, they fulfill the objective.
Following the results presented here, we intend to deploy
a prototype of such inventory and tracking system to assess
its resilience and real world performance.
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